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Marker: Zoning for All!

ZONING FOR ALL! DISPARATE IMPACT LIABILITY AMIDST
THE AFFORDABLE HOUSING CRISIS
Quinn Marker

I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has a housing problem. At its most basic and
unforgiving level, the housing crisis threatens to displace millions of
Americans each year.1 Millions more teeter on the edge of eviction on a
near constant basis, plagued by dwindling emergency funds,2 low wages,3
and rising rents.4 The number of households impacted by this set of
challenges has risen drastically, with the percentage of cost-burdened
renters doubling from just under 24% in the 1960s to over 47% in 2016.5
Times have been particularly challenging for renters, experiencing a 60%
increase in inflation-adjusted median rent between 1960 and 2016, while
inflation-adjusted income has grown by merely 5% through the same
period.6 This culminated in a total of 2.3 million filed evictions in 2016
alone.7 At the same time, the purchase price of homes has risen faster than
wages in 80% of U.S. markets, putting home ownership out of reach for
most Americans.8 While the crisis is most often realized in the form of
1. In 2016, 2.3 million evictions were filed, resulting in about 900,000 evicted households.
National Estimates: Eviction in America, EVICTION LAB, PRINCETON UNIV. (May 11, 2018),
https://evictionlab.org/national-estimates/ [https://perma.cc/ZP85-ZZFP]; see also Terry Gross, FirstEver Evictions Database Shows: 'We're In the Middle Of A Housing Crisis’, NPR (Apr. 12, 2019, 1:07
PM),
https://www.npr.org/2018/04/12/601783346/first-ever-evictions-database-shows-were-in-themiddle-of-a-housing-crisis [https://perma.cc/K355-ELMV].
2. Only 61% of U.S. Adults could cover an unexpected $400 expense without going into debt.
FED. RESERVE, REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF U.S. HOUSEHOLDS IN 2018, 21 (2019),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2018-report-economic-well-being-us-households201905.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7CC-DXMP].
3. “The real value of the federal minimum wage has dropped 17% since 2009 and 31% since
1968.” DAVID COOPER ET AL., ECON. POLICY INST., LOW-WAGE WORKERS ARE SUFFERING FROM A
2 (2019),
DECLINE
IN
THE
REAL
VALUE
OF
THE
FEDERAL
MINIMUM
WAGE
https://www.epi.org/publication/labor-day-2019-minimum-wage/
[https://perma.cc/J3GQ-FLSE].
4. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARV. UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING
2018, 1 (2018),
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Harvard_JCHS_State_of_the_Nations_Housing_2018.pd
f [https://perma.cc/PM9E-MEE7].
5. Id. at 5. A cost-burdened household spends 30% or more of their income on housing costs. id.;
see id. at 40 for a table illustrating cost-burdened households among renters and homeowners from 20012016.
6. Id. at 5.
7. Gross, supra note 1.
8. Alcynna Lloyd, Home prices are rising faster than wages in 80% of U.S. markets,
HOUSINGWIRE (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.housingwire.com/articles/47878-home-prices-are-risingfaster-than-wages-in-80-of-us-markets [https://perma.cc/P8KQ-J9YQ].
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these and other financial conflicts, imposing questions about race, class,
and health9 are all brought to bear when confronting the crisis head-on.
The Fair Housing Act’s10 (“FHA” or the “Act”) disparate impact
liability, formally recognized in Texas Department of Housing &
Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.,11 can play a
leading role in solving the issue, particularly in eliminating restrictive
land use policies across the country. Recent interpretations of Inclusive
Communities by federal courts have stripped the Act of much of its power
and threaten to perpetuate the housing crisis. This comment examines the
state of disparate impact liability under the Fair Housing Act and assesses
its long-term utility as a tool to combat the housing crisis. Part II first
examines the impacts of restrictive land use policy before providing a
brief history of disparate impact liability under the Fair Housing Act. Part
II concludes with an overview of notable disparate impact litigation,
including the landmark case: Texas Department of Housing & Community
Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. Finally, Part III argues the
weakened disparate impact liability currently being applied throughout
several circuit courts, is not in accord with the Fair Housing Act. Part III
concludes with a proposed burden shifting framework that protects the
interests of both parties, while fulfilling the stated purpose of the Fair
Housing Act: “to provide … for fair housing throughout the United
States.”12
II. BACKGROUND
Land use policy controls the way people move throughout their cities.
It dictates where they work, live, and gather. To be sure, thoughtful
zoning schemes can, and often do, have merit, but they can also present
challenges—including economic and racial segregation. This Part first, in
Section A, presents the impacts of exclusionary zoning and the Supreme
Court’s treatment of such schemes. Then, Section B presents the Fair
Housing Act and the origins of disparate impact liability. Next, Section C
examines the Supreme Court’s interpretation of disparate impact liability
in the seminal case, Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs
v. Inclusive Communities Project Inc. Lastly, Section D examines the
various approaches taken by circuit courts in their application of
9. Individuals threatened with eviction are more likely to suffer from physical and mental health
issues, including high blood pressure and depression. See Hugo Vásquez-Vera et al., The threat of home
eviction and its effects on health through the equity lens: A systematic review, 175 SOC. SCI & MED. 199,
205 (2017).
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-91); see also Discriminatory
Conduct Under the Fair Housing Act, 24 C.F.R. § 100.5 (LEXIS 2019).
11. 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-91).
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Inclusive Communities.
A. The far-reaching impacts of restrictive land use policy
While local land use policy often goes unnoticed in daily life,
increasingly restrictive land use policies, such as single-family zoning,
minimum lot sizes, and other density restrictions, have far-reaching
negative implications on the housing market for renters, low-income
individuals, and minorities.13 These policies, particularly single-family
zoning, contribute to decreased density and lead to “fewer housing
opportunities for low income and minority residents than those [cities]
that have embraced a new paradigm for regulating growth and
development.”14
Although experts measure the impacts of restrictive land use policy
differently, most research suggests that density restrictions lead to income
and racial segregation.15 At a basic level, economists argue density
restrictions, like minimum lot sizes and single-family zoning, increase
housing costs by making construction more expensive and constraining
total supply.16 These restrictions have increased in recent years and can
be measured by tracking land costs over time.17 Between 2013 and 2016
the cost of buying land, typically reflected in a comparison between home
prices and construction costs, increased by nearly 25% compared to the
average span in the 1990s.18 Likewise, despite only making up 13% of the
total United States population, African-Americans live, on average, in
communities that are 46% African-American.19 At the same time, white
13. See ROLF PENDALL, ROBERT PUENTES, & JONATHAN MARTIN, BROOKINGS INST., FROM
TRADITIONAL TO REFORMED: A REVIEW OF THE LAND USE REGULATIONS IN THE NATION’S 50 LARGEST
METROPOLITAN
AREAS
5
(2006),
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/20060802_Pendall.pdf [https://perma.cc/CKW7-QJ62].
14. Id. at 2.
15. Michael C. Lens & Paavo Monkkonen, Do Strict Land Use Regulations Make Metropolitan
Areas More Segregated by Income?, 82 J. AM. PLAN. ASS‘N 6, 9 (2015),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5800413/ [https://perma.cc/2H9D-NEBH] (“We can
conclude that density restrictions lead to increased income and racial segregation, but it is less clear how
other forms of land use regulation affect income segregation.”).
16. JOSEPH GYOURKO & RAVEN MOLLOY, HANDBOOK OF REGIONAL AND URBAN ECONOMICS
1316 (2015), https://faculty.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Regulation-and-HousingSupply-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/9N9X-6VJG] (“regulation increases the marginal cost of construction,
both directly through the fees and time costs and indirectly by requiring construction to follow certain
forms . . . . [S]ome types of regulation such as growth controls effectively make the marginal cost of
housing infinite by constraining the total number of housing units allowed.”).
17. Jason Furman, Opinion, Reform land use, promote shared growth of new housing, S.F. CHRON.
(Sept. 25, 2016), https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/openforum/article/Reform-land-use-promoteshared-growth-of-new-9283703.php [https://perma.cc/BN3B-75GP].
18. Id.
19. William H. Frey, Op-Ed, Census Data: Blacks and Hispanics Take Different Segregation
Paths, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 16, 2010), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/census-data-blacks-and-
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Americans make up 64% of the population and live in communities that
are 79% white.20 Even when controlling for socioeconomic factors,
housing patterns remain largely segregated by race.21
In response, land use reform has gained traction in recent years. In
2016, the Obama administration published a toolkit urging local
governments to adopt modern land use best practices, such as allowing
accessory dwellings, eliminating parking requirements, and instituting
multi-family zoning.22 Cities and states across the country, most notably
Minneapolis and the state of Oregon, answered the call and eliminated
exclusionary zoning.23 Many others are poised to follow suit, sparking
impassioned cries of the Yes In My Backyard (“YIMBY”) movement to
counteract the anti-reform Not In My Backyard (“NIMBY”) movement.24
The Supreme Court is no stranger to exclusionary zoning either. In
1917, the Court deemed race-based zoning unconstitutional under the
14th Amendment in Buchannan v. Warley.25 Many cities, particularly in
the South, defiantly ignored the prohibition and enacted new race based
zoning codes anyway.26 Following the prohibition of race-based zoning,
many cities began to employ other forms of facially-neutral exclusionary
zoning, such as single family zoning, to control where people lived. From
a YIMBY’s perspective, single-family zoning keeps lower-income
hispanics-take-different-segregation-paths/ [https://perma.cc/X5YR-KJDZ].
20. Id.
21. Douglas S. Massey, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass, 96
A M.
J.
SOC.
329,
352
(1990)
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2781105.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ad8e47ca6a85d1cface5880ab5c341
430 [https://perma.cc/WF5N-AXPP].
22. THE
WHITE
HOUSE,
HOUSING
DEVELOPMENT
TOOLKIT
3
(2016),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/Housing_Development_Toolkit%20f.2.p
df [https://perma.cc/K4UV-3KYR].
23. See Sarah Mervosh, Minneapolis, Tackling Housing Crisis and Inequity, Votes to End SingleFamily Zoning, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/13/us/minneapolissingle-family-zoning.html [https://perma.cc/VH9U-R79Q]; Elliot Njus, Bill to eliminate single-family
zoning in Oregon neighborhoods passes final legislative hurdle, THE OREGONIAN (June 30, 2019),
https://www.oregonlive.com/politics/2019/06/bill-to-eliminate-single-family-zoning-in-oregonneighborhoods-passes-final-legislative-hurdle.html [https://perma.cc/4ATZ-9EMN].
24. See, e.g., Alexei Koseff, California housing: New laws aim to make it easier to build, S.F.
CHRON (Oct. 9, 2019),
https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/California-housing-New-laws-aim-to-makeit14504985.php [https://perma.cc/BQ5U-G9JZ] (new legislation includes a five-year moratorium on
exclusionary zoning and series of bill streamlining the process for accessory dwellings); see also Alana
Semuels, From ‘Not in My Backyard’ to ‘Yes in My Backyard’, THE ATLANTIC (Jul. 5, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/07/yimby-groups-pro-development/532437/
[https://perma.cc/J34V-DHMS].
25. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
26. See RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR
GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 46-48 (2017). Rothstein describes the post-Buchannan race-based
zoning codes in Atlanta, Indianapolis, Richmond (VA), Birmingham, West Palm Beach, Austin, Kansas
City, and Norfolk. Some continued into the late 1980s.
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families from moving into a more affluent area by blocking more
affordable multi-family development. From a NIMBY’s perspective,
single-family zoning is valuable tool to preserve property values and
neighborhood character. The Supreme Court took the side of the
NIMBY’s and held single-family zoning constitutional in Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty, noting that zoning regulations should be upheld
as long as there is some connection to public welfare.27 In so holding, the
Court characterized multi-family buildings as a “mere parasite,
constructed in order to take advantage of the open spaces and attractive
surroundings created by the residential character of the district.”28 One
year prior to Buchannan, in 1916, just eight cities in the United States had
zoning codes.29 In 1936, in the wake of Buchannan and Euclid, 1,246
cities had restrictive zoning codes in place.30 The FHA aimed to confront
this and other types of discrimination directly.
Two years after the passage of the Act, exclusionary zoning was again
recognized as a major problem facing the country when Housing and
Urban Development (“HUD”) Secretary George Romney introduced his
Open Communities Plan.31 Romney intended to eliminate exclusionary
zoning by withholding federal HUD funds from communities whose
zoning codes did not allow for subsidized multi-family buildings for
African-American families.32 The pushback was swift and President
Nixon removed Secretary Romney and his Open Communities Plan
shortly thereafter.33 In the years following the passage of the Act, with
discrimination taking on new, covert forms, many courts construed the
Act broadly in order to implement the Act’s stated purpose: “to provide
… for fair housing throughout the United States.”34

27. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 387-89 (1926).
28. Id. at 394.
29. Elizabeth Winkler, ‘Snob zoning’ is racial housing segregation by another name, WASH. POST
(SEPT. 25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/09/25/snob-zoning-is-racialhousing-segregation-by-another-name/ [https://perma.cc/BE2Y-69YR].
30. Id.
31. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 26 at 201.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-91); see generally Trafficante v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209-10 (1972) (noting the “broad and inclusive language” of
the FHA allows parties injured by the “loss of important benefits from interracial associations” to bring a
claim); Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 95 (1977) (recognizing “that Congress has
made a strong national commitment to promote integrated housing.”).
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B. The Fair Housing Act aimed to remedy a century of discrimination
and racism
1. Historical Background of the Fair Housing Act
The roots of housing discrimination run deep. After the Civil War, the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 purported to outlaw housing discrimination, but
the Supreme Court did not officially recognize the prohibition until
1968.35 In February of the same year the Kerner Commission, in a report
commissioned by President Lyndon B. Johnson, warned the country was
“moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and
unequal.”36 Just seven days after Martin Luther King Jr. was assassinated,
and with National Guard troops on call in the basement of the Capitol,37
Congress passed the FHA as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.38
Senator Walter Mondale, one of the bill’s lead sponsors and co-authors,
characterized it as a means to promote “truly integrated and balanced
living patterns.”39 The Act’s stated purpose is closely aligned with
Senator Mondale’s sentiment: “to provide, within constitutional
limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States.”40 In its current
form, the Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion,
national origin, sex, familial status, and disability.41
2. Types of Discrimination Covered Under the Act
There are two types of discrimination protected under the Act:
disparate treatment and disparate impact. Disparate treatment requires the
plaintiff to prove the defendant “had a discriminatory intent or motive.”42
35. Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 436 (1968) (“In light of the concerns that led Congress to adopt
[the Civil Rights Act of 1866] and the contents of the debates that preceded its passage, it is clear that the
Act was designed to do just what its terms suggest: to prohibit all racial discrimination, whether or not
under color of law, with respect to the rights enumerated therein–including the right to purchase or lease
property.”) (emphasis added).
36. KERNER COMM’N, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS
1 (1968) https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/8073NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/53UQ-D7VL].
37. Douglas S. Massey, The Legacy of the 1968 Fair Housing Act, 30 SOC. F. 571, 575 (2015)
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/socf.12178 [https://perma.cc/2XSN-723S].
38. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601-3631 (2012)).
39. 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale) Mondale further
added that, “segregated housing is the simple rejection of one human being by another without any
justification but superior power; we have closed our hearts to our fellow human beings to the extent that
we have closed our neighborhoods to them.” Id.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-91).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-91).
42. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2513
(2015).
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Disparate treatment discrimination broadly covers discrimination in the
“sale, rental, or advertising of dwellings, in the provision of brokerage
services, or in the availability of residential real estate-related
transactions.”43 HUD regulations identify additional activities considered
to be disparate treatment discrimination including “blockbusting,”44
steering,45 and denying membership or participation in any organization
related to real estate services, such as a real estate brokers association.46
Alternatively, disparate impact discrimination provides protection for
those harmed by a facially neutral policy or practice that has a
discriminatory effect.47 There are two instances typically suited for
disparate impact liability: (1) where a decision has a “greater adverse
impact on one racial group than on another”48 and (2) where a decision
“perpetuates segregation and thereby prevents interracial association.”49
Unlike disparate treatment, disparate impact liability has not always
been universally recognized. However, by 2013, twelve federal circuit
courts recognized disparate impact liability, but differed in their analysis
of the issue.50 HUD formalized disparate impact liability with a 2013 rule,
in line with their “long-held interpretation” of the theory.51 Not only did
the new regulation formally acknowledge the availability of disparate
impact liability, but it also set forth a uniform standard for evaluating
disparate impact claims.52 The rule sets forth a three step burden shifting
framework, requiring the following: (1) claimant must make their prima
facie case by “proving that a challenged practice caused or predictably

43. Discriminatory Conduct Under the Fair Housing Act, 24 C.F.R. § 100.5(a) (LEXIS through
Sep. 16, 2019).
44. 24 C.F.R. § 100.85(c) (LEXIS 2019) (Such prohibited actions include engaging in profitmotivated conduct which: “… conveys to a person that a neighborhood is undergoing or is about to
undergo a change [regarding a protected class] in order to encourage the person to offer a dwelling for
sale or rental [or] (2) [e]ncouraging, for profit, any person to sell or rent a dwelling through assertions that
the entry or prospective entry of persons of [a protected class], can or will result in undesirable
consequences for the project, neighborhood or community.”).
45. 24 C.F.R. § 100.70 (LEXIS 2019) (defined as, “to restrict or attempt to restrict the choices of
a person by word or conduct in connection with seeking, negotiating for, buying or renting a dwelling so
as to perpetuate, or tend to perpetuate, segregated housing patterns, or to discourage or obstruct choices
in a community, neighborhood or development.”).
46. 24 C.F.R. § 100.90 (LEXIS 2019).
47. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (LEXIS 2019).
48. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir.
1977).
49. Id.; see also Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209-12 (1972)
(recognizing “the loss of important benefits from interracial associations” impacting “the whole
community,” not just excluded tenants, as a cognizable injury under the Act).
50. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act's Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg.
11460 (Feb. 15, 2013).
51. Id.
52. Id.
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will cause a discriminatory effect,”53 (2) if claimant satisfies its burden,
respondent must prove “the challenged practice is necessary to achieve
one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests,”54 (3) if
satisfied, claimant can still prevail if able to “prov[e] that the substantial,
legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests supporting the challenged practice
could be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory
effect.”55 The framework specifically noted that any of the defendant’s
justifications must “be supported by evidence and may not be
hypothetical or speculative.”56 While the regulation went a long way
towards the standardization of disparate impact liability, the Supreme
Court, just 23 months later in Inclusive Communities, neglected to
expressly adopt the framework and in so doing, limited its bite.57
C. Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive
Communities Project
1. Structural Disagreement in the Lower Courts
While HUD’s recognition of disparate impact liability was a positive
step forward for those suffering at the hands of discriminatory housing
practices, the Supreme Court’s decision in Inclusive Communities limited
its reach.58 This case considered whether the Texas Department of
Housing & Community Affairs (“Department”) violated the FHA when
it disproportionately allocated low-income housing tax credits (“LIHTC”)
to predominantly low-income, African-American neighborhoods. The
plaintiff in the case, the Inclusive Communities Project (“ICP”), alleged
that the state’s LIHTC allocation “has caused continued segregated
housing patterns” and demanded the Department change its selection
criteria59 in order to promote low-income housing in more affluent
suburban areas.60 ICP was armed with compelling data to illustrate the

53. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1) (LEXIS 2019).
54. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(2) (LEXIS 2019).
55. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(3) (LEXIS 2019). But see Am. Ins. Assoc. v. Dept of Hous. and Urban
Dev., 74 F. Supp. 3d 30, 47 (Dist. D.C. 2014) (holding HUD overstepped its authority to promulgate
disparate impact regulation and declaring 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 “vacated”), vacated per curiam, No. 145321, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 16894 (D.C. Cir. Sep. 23, 2015).
56. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(b)(ii)(2) (LEXIS 16, 2019).
57. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2513
(2015).
58. Id.
59. Applications for LIHTC credits were scored on a point system, including statutory metrics
such as financial feasibility and income level of tenants, in addition to criteria such as the quality of the
surrounding schools. Id.
60. Id. at 2514.
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disparity, satisfying their burden for a prima facie case according to the
district court and ultimately prevailing when the Department failed to
prove “that there [we]re no less discriminatory alternatives” to meet their
stated objective.61 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed. Although the
Fifth Circuit agreed with the consensus that disparate impact claims
should be recognized, it took issue with the district court’s burden shifting
framework and the absence of any causation analysis beyond the ICP’s
“bare statistical evidence.”62
2. The Supreme Court’s Recognition (and Limitation) of Disparate
Impact
The Supreme Court, in a narrow 5-4 decision, affirmed the decision of
the Fifth Circuit in regards to the availability of disparate impact claims,
holding them to be “consistent with the Act’s central purpose.” The Court
specifically pointed to discriminatory land use practices as a prime
example of disparate impact discrimination, but remanded the case63 to
be considered in light of several limitations outlined in the majority
opinion.64 The Court argued that the Act has “always been properly
limited in key respects that avoid the serious constitutional questions that
might arise under the [Act].”65 First, a claimant’s prima facie case must
be subjected to a “robust causality requirement,” pointing to the specific
policy or policies at issue creating the disparity.66 These limitations serve
to protect developers and housing authorities from being “held liable for
racial disparities they did not create.”67 The Court buttressed this
limitation by pointing to its fear that organizations would resort to the use
of numerical quotas to ensure racial balance68 and cautioned courts that a
broad disparate impact liability could “inject racial considerations into

61. Id. (Over 90% of LIHTC units in Dallas were in areas with less than 50% white residents. ICP
also argued from 1999-2008 the Department approved LIHTC applications for almost half (49.7%) of
units proposed in areas comprised of less than 10% white residents, while only approving 37.4% in areas
with over 90% white residents.).
62. Id. at 2515.
63. On remand, the district court held that ICP “failed to prove a prima facie case of
discrimination.” Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, No. 3:08-CV0546-D, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114562, at *42-43 (N.D. Tex. 2016).
64. Tex Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty, Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522-523
(2015).
65. Id. at 2522.
66. The Court noted that a “one-time decision may not be a policy at all.” id. at 2523; but see
Mhany Mgmt. v. Cnty. of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 619 (2nd Cir. 2016) (holding a zoning decision for a
single parcel of land constituted a “general policy”).
67. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2523.
68. Id.
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every housing decision.”69
Second, defendants must be given “leeway”70 to prove the practice is
“necessary to achieve a valid interest.”71 In support of this limit, the Court
argued that it would be inconsistent with the goal of the Act to “impose
onerous costs” on well-intentioned developers.72 The Court offered
further reassurance to developers, noting the Act does not put them “in a
double bind of liability” based on where they choose to develop.73 The
Court also noted the complex, and often subjective, decisions that zoning
officials must make when confronting issues such as historic
preservation.74 Third, the Court instructed courts that all remedial
measures in disparate impact cases should be strictly race-neutral.75
D. Inclusive Communities: Varied Application, Varied Results
It did not take long for courts across the country to apply their version
of the Inclusive Communities approach to disparate impact claims. This
section highlights the varied applications of Inclusive Communities which
has led to mixed results and relative confusion. First, Sections 1, 2, and 3
present three divergent applications of the “robust causality” requirement.
Next, Section 4 examines the application of the final step of the burden
shifting framework—the plaintiff’s showing of a less discriminatory
alternative. Then, Section 5 covers the hostility towards single-family
zoning that has remained in disparate impact liability. Finally, Section 6
highlights HUD’s proposed framework changes published in August
2019.
1. A prima facie case plus proximate cause
The Eleventh Circuit interpreted robust causality as a general limiting
factor on disparate impact claims, aiming to guard developers and cities
from becoming “overburden[ed].”76 In Oviedo Town Center v. City of
Oviedo, the court held that increases in utility rates in low-income rental
housing did not “establish a disparate impact, let alone any causal

69. Id. at 2524; The Court’s cautious majority opinion goes on to say that a broad disparate impact
liability would, not only undermine the Act, but would undermine the “free-market system.” Id.
70. Id. at 2522.
71. Id. at 2523.
72. Id.
73. Id. Meaning developers would be “subject to suit whether they choose to rejuvenate a city core
or to promote new low-income housing in suburban communities.” Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 2524.
76. Oviedo Town Ctr. II, L.L.L.P. v. City of Oviedo, 759 F. App'x 828, 834 (11th Cir. 2018).
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connection between the [rate increases] and the disparate impact.”77 The
court rejected the plaintiff’s offer of statistical evidence as, “nothing more
than a showing that a policy impacted more members of a protected class
than non-members of protected classes.”78 This is generally aligned with
the guidance in Inclusive Communities that courts should “avoid
interpreting disparate-impact liability to be so expansive as to inject racial
considerations into every housing decision.”79 However, this requirement
operates much more strictly in practice when an additional showing of
proximate cause is required.80
2. Robust causality as proven by statistical evidence
The Fourth Circuit focused on the presence of statistical evidence that
led to a direct and cognizable consequence. In de Reyes v. Waples Mobile
Home Park, a mobile home park began enforcing a policy requiring all
residents to provide citizenship documentation—a policy that previously
went unenforced and only applied to individuals named on the lease.81
The enforcement of the policy was shown to adversely impact Latinx
residents in the mobile home park, such that they were ten times more
likely to be negatively impacted.82 The court suggested that while it is
imperative for the plaintiff to prove the disparity “is the result of one or
more of the [] practices that they are attacking,” evident statistical
disparities can ease the causation burden.83
3. Arbitrary and Unnecessary Requirement
The Eighth Circuit added an additional requirement to the already
burdensome prima facie case standard: requiring the plaintiff to allege

77. Id. at 835.
78. Id. at 834; see also de Reyes v. Waples Mobile Home Park L.P., 903 F.3d 415, 434 (4th Cir.
2018) (Keenan, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that “geographical happenstance cannot give rise to liability
against an entity not responsible for the geographical distribution.”).
79. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2524; See also Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 653 (1989) (arguing that disparate impact claims in workplace supported by only
bare statistical evidence of racial disparities would lead to troubling use of quota system in the workplace).
80. Oviedo Town Ctr., 759 F. App'x at 836 (noting that even if a prime facie case had been
presented “we would then proceed to consider the causal relation.”) (emphasis added).
81. de Reyes, 903 F.3d at 419.
82. Id. at 428 (“Latinos constitute 64.6% of the total undocumented immigrant population in
Virginia, … are ten times more likely than non-Latinos to be adversely affected by the Policy, as
undocumented immigrants constitute 36.4% of the Latino population compared with only 3.6% of the
non-Latino population.”); see also Inclusive Cmtys. Project v. Lincoln Prop. Co. 920 F.3d 890, 906 (5th
Cir 2019) (focusing on the behavior change in the 4th Circuit’s robust causation analysis).
83. de Reyes, 903 F.3d at 425, 428 (noting that statistical evidence demonstrating the result of the
park’s documentation requirement satisfied prima facie standard).
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facts demonstrating the policy at issue is “arbitrary or unnecessary.”84 In
Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, the court rejected a plaintiff’s claim that a
city housing code aimed to discourage for-profit rental housing.85 Here,
plaintiffs alleged the city’s vague housing code and rental license
revocations displaced “protected class families” from their rental units.86
The court rejected the plaintiff’s claim, specifically pointing to the lack
of “factually supported allegations that [the] provisions are arbitrary or
unnecessary to health and safety.”87 The Eighth Circuit’s prima facie
standard is particularly burdensome in this way; requiring not only robust
causality, but a showing that the challenged practice is arbitrary and
unnecessary.
4. Less Discriminatory Alternatives
The interests of the defendants, typically developers and
municipalities, are closely guarded in the third step of the burden shifting
framework as well. If defendants carry their burden of proving the
challenged practice is necessary to achieve their stated interest, the
plaintiff can still prevail if they offer “an available alternative … practice
that has less disparate impact and serves the [entity’s] legitimate needs.”88
This standard operates as a relatively tough bar for plaintiffs to meet. For
instance, in Inclusive Communities Project v. Lincoln Property Company,
the Fifth Circuit rejected a plaintiff’s showing of less discriminatory
alternatives to the defendant’s practice of refusing to accept tenants
paying with Section 8 vouchers.89 The court noted that the plaintiff failed
to demonstrate how the alternative programs would be managed or if the
plaintiff could financially support them.90 However, in Mhany
Management v. County of Nassau, a plaintiff’s showing that an alternative
zoning code would serve the city’s interests in traffic reduction below
current levels, satisfied the burden even though the city’s proposed zoning
code would have actually reduced traffic more effectively.91

84. Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, 860 F.3d 1106, 1112 (8th Cir. 2017).
85. Id. at 1112.
86. Id. at 1109.
87. Id. at 1112.
88. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2518 (2015)
(alterations in original); see also 24 C.F.R. 100.500(c)(3) (LEXIS through Sep. 16, 2019 issue).
89. Inclusive Cmtys. Project v. Lincoln Property Co., 920 F.3d 890, 906 (5th Cir. 2019).
90. Id. (“[I]f ICP's programs were not successfully executed, Lincoln and the Owners ‘could
experience financial harm.’”).
91. Mhany Mgmt. v. Cty. of Nassau, No. 05-cv-2301, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153214, at *37
(E.D.N.Y. Sep. 19, 2017).
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5. A hostility towards single-family zoning remains prevalent
Despite the warning from Inclusive Communities that a decision to
build on a single site, as opposed to a citywide scheme, “may not be a
policy at all," courts generally accept a single instance of restrictive land
use policy as sufficient to form the basis of a prima facie case of disparate
impact.92 For instance, the Second Circuit expressed a strong opposition
to restrictive land use policies, like single-family zoning, in Mhany
Management. v. County. of Nassau, even when the zoning decision only
affected a single site.93 In Mhany, after residents of a town with no
affordable housing94 voiced strong opposition to the prospect of multifamily development on the site, the city developed a new zoning code that
effectively eliminated the possibility of multi-family development on the
parcel.95 The court pointed to the specific identification of restrictive
zoning by Inclusive Communities as evidence that even if a single
decision rather than a widespread policy was at issue, such restrictions
“function unfairly to exclude minorities from certain neighborhoods
without any sufficient justification" and are "at the heartland of disparateimpact liability.”96 Other federal circuit courts have also required a higher
showing of disparate impact by plaintiffs for “affirmative … obligations
on private actors,” such as changing a voucher-acceptance policy, while
removing barriers like restrictive zoning are treated more favorably for
plaintiffs.97
6. Recent interpretations by HUD threaten to obliterate disparate impact
In a continued effort to strip down disparate impact liability, the Trump
administration, through HUD, proposed regulations in August 2019 that,
if adopted, would combine many of the above restrictions into a new, five-

92. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2523-524.
93. Mhany Mgmt., 819 F.3d at 619.
94. Id. at 587. In this case, affordable housing meant “housing which requires no more than 30%
of a household's income for households earning 80% or less of the Area Median Income for the NassauSuffolk Metropolitan Statistical Area.” Id. at n.1.
95. Id. at 596.
96. Id. at 619 (quoting Tex Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty, Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S.
Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015)); see also Huntington v. Huntington Branch, NAACP, 488 U.S. 15, 17 (1988)
(holding single-family zoning has a discriminatory impact because it “restricts private construction of
low-income housing to the largely minority urban renewal area, which ‘significantly perpetuated
segregation’”); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1186 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that the
“ultimate effect” and the “historical context” of single-family zoning were discriminatory). But see
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hou. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 (1976) (holding that plaintiff
failed to prove discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in request to rezone area for multi-family
housing).
97. Inclusive Cmtys. Project v. Lincoln Property Co., 920 F.3d 890, 908 (5th Cir. 2019).
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part burden on the plaintiff.98 Under this approach, a plaintiff would be
required to prove: (1) the practice is “arbitrary, artificial, and
unnecessary to achieve a valid interest or legitimate objective;” (2) a
“robust causal link;” (3) “that the challenged policy or practice has an
adverse effect on members of a protected class;” (4) that the disparity is
“significant;” (5) that the “complaining party’s alleged injury is directly
caused” by the practice.99 Notably, the proposed framework eliminates a
respondent’s burden of identifying a valid interest served by the policy
unless the plaintiff proves that practice is “arbitrary, artificial, and
unnecessary.”100 HUD then offers several possible defenses for
respondents including claims of limited discretion,101 challenges to robust
causality,102 and several types of challenges to the plaintiff’s statistical
models.103
III. DISCUSSION
It is wrong to limit disparate impact liability under the FHA. Moreover,
federal courts are largely setting standards that are too onerous to meet
outside of very specific scenarios with clear causation—a situation
inconsistent with disparate impact liability as a whole. Section A of this
Part argues that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Inclusive Communities
places too many limits on an already restrictive theory. Section B analyzes
the flawed application of the standard in federal courts across the country,
focusing on the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits. Section C then analyzes the
common-sense workability of the Fourth and Second Circuit’s application
of the standard. Finally, Section D proposes an alternative framework that
stays true to the stated purpose of the Act, while also accounting for the
Supreme Court’s safeguards identified in Inclusive Communities.

98. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. 42,
854 (proposed Aug, 9, 2019) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R 100). https://s3.amazonaws.com/publicinspection.federalregister.gov/2019-17542.pdf [https://perma.cc/94GK-UNCX]; see also Lola Fadula,
Trump Proposal Would Raise Bar for Proving Housing Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/02/us/politics/trump-housing-discrimination.html
[https://perma.cc/9KGF-EAW6].
99. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. 42,
854, 15-17.
100. Id. at 16 (“If a plaintiff adequately alleges facts to support the assertion that the practice or
policy is arbitrary, artificial, and unnecessary, only then does the defendant have the burden to identify a
valid interest or interests that the challenged policy or practice serves.”).
101. Id. at 18 (“Paragraph (c)(1) provides that the defendant may show its discretion is materially
limited by a third party.”).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 19.
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A. The Supreme Court overly constrained disparate impact liability in
Inclusive Communities
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Inclusive Communities is overly
restrictive and has directly caused the atrophy of disparate impact
liability104 in courts across the country in the following ways: (1) the
robust causality requirement of a plaintiff’s prima facie case is too
demanding in a typical disparate impact situation and (2) the defendant’s
burden of proof is far too minimal to have any real bite.
First, robust causality provides too much focus on proximate cause
when the entire aim of disparate impact is to provide an avenue for relief
when intent cannot be proved by an injured party.105 HUD’s 2013
regulations admittedly do not provide much guidance in this regard, but
Inclusive Communities goes too far in its application and requirement of
“robust causality.” While the HUD regulations require proof of a
discriminatory effect, plaintiffs are able to prove that a practice “caused
or predictably will cause” the effect.106 Though it is necessary to identify
the practice at issue, imposing an onerous causation requirement as the
Court did in Inclusive Communities undercuts the purpose of disparate
impact—finding relief from discrimination when overt intent is difficult
to prove.107
Next, the defendant’s burden of proof is far too low to apply without
dismantling disparate impact altogether. HUD’s 2013 regulations
formalized the second step of the burden shifting framework and required
the defendant to prove that “the challenged practice is necessary to
achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory
interests.”108 The Inclusive Communities decision, on the other hand,
allows a policy to stand if the defendant can prove, with so-called
“leeway,” the policy “is necessary to achieve a valid interest.”109 The
Court makes a comparison to workplace requirements, noting that a

104. Disparate impact liability was already extremely limited in practice, having been successful
for plaintiffs merely 18 times between 1974-2013 (19.6% of cases). Stacy E. Seichnaydre, Is Disparate
Impact Having an Impact? An Appellate Analysis of Forty Years of Disparate Impact Claims Under the
Fair Housing Act, 63 Am. U. L. Rev. 357, 399 (2013).
105. “Liability may be established under the Fair Housing Act based on a practice's discriminatory
effect, as defined in paragraph (a) of this section, even if the practice was not motivated by a
discriminatory intent.” 24 C.F.R. § 100. 500 (LEXIS 2019).
106. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1) (LEXIS 2019) (emphasis added).
107. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (LEXIS 2019) (“Liability may be established under the Fair Housing Act
based on a practice's discriminatory effect … even if the practice was not motivated by a discriminatory
intent.”).
108. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(2) (LEXIS 2019) (emphasis added).
109. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522-23
(2015) (emphasis added); id. at 2524 (noting without these “safeguards … valid governmental and private
priorities” might be displaced) (emphasis added).
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policy causing a disparate impact can stand if it is a “reasonable
measure[ment] of job performance,” before concluding that although not
an exact fit, “the comparison suffices.”110 This culminates in a drastic
reduction of the defendant’s burden—not only a far cry from the aims of
the Act,111 but entirely inconsistent with HUD’s regulations just two years
prior.112 Moreover, the Court notes concerns facing municipalities when
making complex zoning decisions and the purported “double bind of
liability” that arises when making a decision that impacts a “community’s
quality of life,” while entirely failing to consider the quality of life issues
faced by the injured parties in these cases.113
The Court remains silent on the final step of HUD’s framework
regarding the plaintiff’s proof of nondiscriminatory alternative practices.
However, the defendant’s standard is so minimal that virtually any
justification allows policies having a disparate impact to stand. Given the
lack of limitations placed on this final step, some lower courts have taken
advantage to allow some disparate impact claims to survive.114
The Court’s opinion is also internally inconsistent, applying these
restrictive standards just pages after formally recognizing disparate
impact claims as part of the Act and noting that “zoning laws and other
housing restrictions that function unfairly to exclude minorities from
certain neighborhoods … reside at the heartland of disparate-impact
liability.”115 The Court mentions developers and tenants alike have found,
and should continue to find, relief under the disparate impact theory, but
quickly “limit[s] [the Act] in key respects.”116
B. The inequitable application of a flawed standard in federal circuit
courts
Circuit courts have taken the guidance provided in Inclusive
Communities as credence to promote further inequity. First, Section 1
argues that the Eleventh Circuit’s addition of proximate cause to the prima
face case is unworkable. Next, Section 2 argues the burden of proving the
necessity of a practice should fall on the defendant.

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 2523.
See supra Section II.B.1.
See supra Section II.B.2.
Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2523.
See supra Section II.D.4.
Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2521-22 (emphasis added).
Id. at 2522 (emphasis added).
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1. Robust causality does not include an independent finding of
proximate cause
The Eleventh Circuit’s focus on proximate caused created an
unworkable standard in Oviedo Town Ctr. II, L.L.L.P. v. City of Oviedo.117
Here, a developer claimed a city’s utility rate increase disproportionately
impacted minority residents.118 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, affirming
the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the city and
dismissing the disparate impact claim.119 The court establishes the
proximate cause requirement as a separate step in and of itself, apparently
trying to align itself with its interpretation of Inclusive Communities.120
While Inclusive Communities mandates a causal connection, the Court is
clear in its acceptance of statistical evidence as demonstrating that
connection.121 Admittedly, the plaintiff’s statistical evidence in support of
its prima facie case was weak in this case.122 However, the court notes
that even with strong statistical evidence it would then proceed to
proximate cause considerations.123 This additional level of scrutiny on a
plaintiff’s claim entirely conflates the Court’s guidance in Inclusive
Communities as well as the relevant HUD regulations.124
2. A prima facie case does not require a showing that the practice was
arbitrary and unnecessary
The Eighth Circuit’s rejection of a prima facie case based on the
plaintiff’s failure to prove the practice was “arbitrary and unnecessary”
placed an unnecessary burden on the plaintiff— making the standard
nearly unreachable.125 While Inclusive Communities heightened the
standard for “robust causality,” the Court does not demand a plaintiff
demonstrate the challenged practice is arbitrary or unnecessary.126 The
Inclusive Communities Court does include this language, noting that
117. Oviedo Town Ctr. II, L.L.L.P. v. City of Oviedo, 759 F. App'x 828 (11th Cir. 2018).
118. Id. at 830.
119. Id. at 839.
120. Id. at 836.
121. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2523 ("[a] plaintiff who fails to allege facts
at the pleading stage or produce statistical evidence demonstrating a causal connection cannot make out
a prima facie case of disparate impact.") (emphasis added).
122. Oviedo Town Ctr., 759 F. App'x at 833, 835 (appellants presented only the results of a selfreported survey that only demonstrated that more minority residents lived in complex compared to the
rest of the City).
123. Id. at 836 (noting “a prima facie case of disparate impact might have been presented, and we
would then proceed to consider the causal relation”).
124. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2523.
125. Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, 860 F.3d 1106, 1112 (8th Cir. 2017).
126. See supra Section II.C.2.
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“policies are not contrary to the disparate-impact requirement unless they
are ‘artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers.’”127 However, this is
not a burden intended for the plaintiff. Rather, it is a clear reference to the
defendant’s required showing that the policy is “necessary to achieve a
valid interest.”128 It would be entirely redundant for the Court to have
required a necessity showing by both parties. The Eighth Circuit’s
approach would dictate for the following burden shifting framework: (1)
plaintiff makes a prima facie case, demonstrating robust causality and that
the challenged practice is arbitrary and unnecessary,129 (2) defendant,
with so-called “leeway,” explains how the challenged practice is
necessary to achieve a valid interest, (3) plaintiff demonstrates a less
discriminatory alternative that would serve defendant’s interest.130 This is
fundamentally at odds with the guidance in Inclusive Communities and
HUD regulations which clearly shoulder the defendant with the burden to
prove the practice is necessary—not the reverse.131
C. The equitable application of a flawed standard in federal circuit
courts
Despite some federal courts weakening disparate impact liability,
others have used Inclusive Communities disparate impact theory to
promote equity. First, Section 1 argues the Fourth Circuit’s use of
statistics is true to the aims of the Act. Next, Section 2 argues for a
plaintiff-friendly standard for proof of less discriminatory alternatives.
1. Compelling statistical evidence can satisfy robust causality
The Fourth Circuit’s acceptance of, and focus on, statistics has allowed
disparate impact liability under Inclusive Communities to serve its true
purpose. Here, the court was confronted with the discriminatory
enforcement of a rule at a mobile home park requiring all residents in the
park to provide documentation proving their legal status in the U.S.132 The
court accepted the statistical evidence133 as “self-evident” of a prima
127. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2524 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)) (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 2523.
129. Ellis, 860 F.3d at 1112.
130. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2522.
131. See 24 C.F.R. 100.500(c)(2) (LEXIS 2019) (“Once the charging party or plaintiff satisfies the
burden of proof set forth in paragraph (c)(1) of this section, the respondent or defendant has the burden of
proving that the challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate,
nondiscriminatory interests of the respondent or defendant.”) (emphasis added).
132. de Reyes v. Waples Mobile Home Park L.P., 903 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir. 2018).
133. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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facie disparate impact claim,134 not requiring a close examination of
causation although it was abundantly clear in this case.135 To be sure,
causation is still a necessary component of disparate impact claims. For
instance, the Supreme Court in Inclusive Communities demands that the
claim must fail if “the plaintiff cannot point to [the] defendant’s policy
or policies causing that disparity.”136 However, the Court also stated that
statistical evidence can demonstrate that causal connection, noting a
plaintiff is required to “allege facts at the pleading stage or produce
statistical evidence demonstrating a causal connection.”137 The additional
step of proximate cause is wholly unnecessary, as demonstrated by
Inclusive Communities’ acceptance of compelling statistics.
2. Less discriminatory alternatives need not be equally effective
The Mhany court’s common-sense approach to the reasonable
alternatives prong of the framework is true to the aim of the Act and to
the Court’s rationale in Inclusive Communities.138 In Mhany, a city’s
rezoning of a single parcel to eliminate the possibility of affordable
housing was held to have a discriminatory effect on minorities.139 On
remand, defendants argued that the plaintiffs must prove that their
proposed alternative would be “equally effective” as their rezoning
strategy.140 The Eastern District of New York disagreed and determined
that the plaintiff’s proposed alternative would only need to “serve[] [the
city’s] interests.”141 Not only is the court’s express rejection of the
“equally effective” standard in line with the stated purpose of the Act, but
it is directly in line with HUD’s interpretation of the burden shifting
134. de Reyes, 903 F.3d at 428 (quoting Betsey v. Turtle Creek Associates 736 F.2d 983, 988 (4th
Cir. 1984)).
135. The policy had historically had only been enforced against the leaseholder, but in mid-2015,
the park began requiring documentation from adult occupant. Id. at 419.
136. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523
(2015).
137. Id.
138. Mhany Mgmt. v. Cnty. of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 618 (2nd Cir. 2016).
139. Id. at 619-20; remanded to No. 05-cv-2301, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153214, at *38 (E.D.N.Y.
Sep. 19, 2017) (holding plaintiff’s burden to prove alternative, nondiscriminatory methods of satisfying
defendant’s interests was satisfied and zoning scheme thus had a disparate impact).
140. Mhany Mgmt., No. 05-cv-2301, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153214, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 19,
2017).
141. Id. at *26; See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act's Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78
Fed. Reg. 11460, 11473 (February 15, 2013) (“The additional modifier "equally effective," borrowed from
the superseded Wards Cove case, is even less appropriate in the housing context than in the employment
area in light of the wider range and variety of practices covered by the Act that are not readily
quantifiable.”). But see Inclusive Cmtys. Project v. Lincoln Prop. Co. 920 F.3d 890, 906 (5th Cir 2019)
(rejecting plaintiff’s showing of less discriminatory alternatives due to financial harm that could be
suffered by defendants).
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framework, noting that it is consistent “with the Joint Policy Statement,
with Congress's codification of the disparate impact standard in the
employment context, and with judicial interpretations of the Fair Housing
Act.”142 Further still, HUD notes that the “equally effective” standard
would be difficult to apply in Fair Housing Act cases, given the challenges
that come along with quantifying many housing practices.143
D. A burden-shifting framework to eliminate exclusionary zoning and
promote equity
This proposed burden shifting framework protects the interests of both
parties and honors the constitutional concerns raised in Inclusive
Communities, while fulfilling the stated purpose of the Fair Housing Act.
Used effectively, the framework could eliminate single-family zoning—
a practice the Supreme Court has identified as “resid[ing] at the heartland
of disparate-impact liability”144 and would promote “integrated and
balanced living patterns.”145
1. A realistic robust causality anchored on statistical evidence
The proposed framework closely follows the current HUD regulations,
while respecting the concerns of the Supreme Court in Inclusive
Communities. First, the plaintiff must present a claim supported by
statistical evidence demonstrating a causal connection. At this stage,
causation should, more often than not, be “self-evident,” assuming the
statistical evidence raises an inference of causation. This step leans
heavily on the guidance of Inclusive Communities, while channeling the
Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of “robust causality,” which allows for
reliance on statistical evidence. While the Supreme Court in Inclusive
Communities was concerned with an overreliance on statistical evidence,
this formulation of the step allows plaintiffs with compelling statistics to
make a prima facie case. However, a claim supported only by statistics
without an inference of causation can and should be rejected.146

142. “HUD does not believe the rule's language needs to be further revised to state that the less
discriminatory alternative must be ‘equally effective,’ or ‘at least as effective,’ in serving the respondent's
or defendant's interests.”
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act's Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11473.
143. Id.
144. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522
(2015).
145. 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale).
146. “But disparate-impact liability has always been properly limited in key respects to avoid
serious constitutional questions that might arise under the FHA, e.g., if such liability were imposed based
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2. A heightened standard of justification for defendants harkens back to
HUD’s regulations
Once this burden is satisfied, a respondent must then demonstrate (a)
that the challenged practice is “necessary to achieve one or more
substantial, legitimate [and] nondiscriminatory interests”147 and (b) that
the challenged practice is not the primary factor furthering the alleged
disparate impact. This step expressly rejects the Supreme Court’s
approach and reverts to the prior HUD language, rather than the low
standard used in Inclusive Communities.148 The step also requires
respondents to demonstrate that the practice is not the primary factor
causing the disparate impact. The reason for both of these changes is
simple: the Fair Housing Act demands it. To allow for the Supreme
Court’s low standard for a respondent’s justification would permit
discrimination if merely “necessary to achieve a valid interest.”149 Surely,
an Act that allows discrimination in furtherance of decreased traffic150
would not “provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing
throughout the United States.”151 Moreover, the added “primary factor”
requirement is also furthering the Act’s objectives. If the Act is to strive
for “truly integrated and balanced living patterns,”152 it must also reject a
policy, even if achieving a valid interest, if it is a primary cause of
furthering the demonstrated discrimination. To do otherwise would be to
ignore the nation’s “historic commitment to creating an integrated
society.”153
3. The final offer of a less discriminatory alternative should be
reasonable
Next, if this burden is carried by the defendant, the plaintiff must then
show either: (a) the respondent’s interest is not “substantial, legitimate,
[and] nondiscriminatory” or (b) the plaintiff’s stated interest could be
achieved by an alternative practice that would have a less discriminatory
effect, even if not as effective as the challenged practice. This final step
solely on a showing of a statistical disparity.” Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2512
(emphasis added).
147. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(2) (LEXIS 2019).
148. Id. (defendant must prove the practice is “necessary to achieve one or more substantial,
legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests”). But see Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2523
(noting that defendants will be allowed to maintain a policy if it is “necessary to achieve a valid interest”).
149. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2523.
150. Mhany Mgmt. v. Cnty. of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 620 (2nd Cir. 2016) (accepting defendant’s
stated interest of traffic control as legitimate governmental interest to restrict multi-family development).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-91).
152. 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale).
153. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2525.
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combines the guidance of HUD, as applied by the Eastern District of New
York, insofar as the alternative practice need not be “equally effective,”
but must merely meet the interest.154 While the burden falls on the
plaintiff at this point, the responsibility to meet a stated interest in a less
discriminatory manner should, in practice, lie with the respondent as they
are typically the party with expertise in the given field. For instance, the
Fifth Circuit’s application of this step rejected the plaintiff’s proposed
alternatives because the respondents could be financially harmed.155
While financial viability must be considered, surely it cannot be the lead
factor in a rejection of a less discriminatory alternative. Moreover, under
this integrated analysis, a reduction in profit would not necessarily render
the alternative invalid, as long as the respondent’s interest was achieved.
4. Exclusionary zoning practices should be reviewed with greater
scrutiny
Moreover, courts should examine instances of exclusionary zoning
with a greater level of scrutiny. First, courts have historically applied a
lower standard of review towards the removal of barriers, such as
eliminating single-family zoning, as opposed to commanding action, such
as forcing landlords to accept housing vouchers.156 Next, the United
States Congress and the Supreme Court have both acknowledged and
taken steps to eliminate similar segregation. The Fair Housing Act was
expressly enacted to eliminate segregation as demonstrated by Senator
Mondale’s plea to replace the ghettos with “truly integrated and balanced
living patterns.”157 The Supreme Court in Inclusive Communities
recognizes the “historic commitment to creating an integrated society.”158
The Court has even recognized the detrimental impacts single-family
zoning can have on everyone—beyond those who are actually being
excluded, noting parties who may not have even been excluded can bring
154. Mhany Mgmt., No. 05-cv-2301, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153214, at *26 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 19,
2017).
155. Inclusive Cmtys. Project v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 906 (5th Cir 2019).
156. Id. at 908-909; see also Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558
F.2d 1283, 1293 (7th Cir. 1977) (“The courts ought to be more reluctant to grant relief when the plaintiff
seeks to compel the defendant to construct integrated housing or take affirmative steps to ensure that
integrated housing is built than when the plaintiff is attempting to build integrated housing on his own
land and merely seeks to enjoin the defendant from interfering with that construction”); Huntington
Branch, NAACP v. Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 936 (1988) (noting that in a disparate impact claim seeking
compelled action, “a defendant would normally have to establish a somewhat more substantial
justification for its adverse action than would be required if the defendant were defending its decision not
to build.”); Lincoln Property Co., 920 F.3d at 908 (distinguishing between compelled action and removal
of arbitrary barriers).
157. 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale).
158. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2525.
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a disparate impact claim based on a “loss of important benefits from
interracial associations.”159
IV. CONCLUSION
Disparate impact liability under the Fair Housing Act is a vital
protection against covert and systemic racism. While the Supreme Court
solidified its existence in Inclusive Communities, subsequent courts,
including the Eleventh, Eighth, and Fifth Circuits have demonstrated the
flawed analysis that can result when applying the Inclusive Communities
framework, particularly in their understanding of robust causality and less
discriminatory alternatives. Others, including the Fourth and Second
Circuits, have aligned themselves closer with the true aims of the Act,
while still honoring the objectives of Inclusive Communities.
Without the full protection for the Fair Housing Act’s disparate impact
liability, “states and others will be left with fewer critical tools to combat
the kinds of systemic discrimination that the Act was intended to
address.”160 A full-powered disparate impact liability, as proposed above,
can and should be implemented. This approach, while in stark contrast to
the recent regulations proposed by HUD,161 zealously and equitably
protects those whom the Act was fundamentally intended to protect: the
nation’s most vulnerable.

159. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209-210 (1972) (noting the “broad
and inclusive” language of the FHA allows parties, injured by the “loss of important benefits from
interracial associations” to bring a claim); see also Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2523
(noting zoning decisions “contribute to a community’s quality of life and are legitimate concerns for
housing authorities”).
160. Brief of Mass., et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 12, Tex. Dep’t of Hous. &
Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015) (No. 13-1371) (noting that it would be a “significant concern to
States” to lose disparate impact liability).
161. See supra Section II.D.6.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2020

23

